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Of whom and what shall I say; ’I know that’! This 
heart within me I can feel, and judge that it exists.
This world I can touch, and I likewise judge that it 
exists. There ends all my knowledge, and the rest is 
construction.
In psychology as in logic, there are truths but no 
truth. Socrates’ ’know thy self’ has as much value as 
the ’be virtuous’ of the confessionals. They reveal a 
nostalgia at the same time as an ignorance. They are 
sterile exercises on great subjects. They legitimate 
only precisely in so far as they approximate.
And here are trees and I know their gnarled surface, 
water and I feel its taste. These scents of grass and 
stars at night, certain evenings when the heart relaxes - 
how shall I negate this world whose power and strength I 
feel? Yet all the knowledge on earth will give me 
nothing to assure me that this world is mine. You 
describe it to me and you teach me to classify it. You 
enumerate its laws and in my thirst for knowledge I admit 
that they are true. You take apart its mechanism and my 
hope increases. At the final stage you teach me that 
this wondrous and multi-coloured universe can be reduced 
to the electron. All this is good and I wait for you to 
continue. But you tell me of an invisible planetary 
system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus.
You explain this world to me with an image. I realize 
then that you have been reduced to poetry; I shall never 
know. Have I time to become indignant? You have already 
changed theories. So that science that was to teach me 
everything ends up in hypothesis, that lucidity flounders 
in metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of 
art. What need I of so many efforts? The soft lines of 
these hills and the hand of evening on this troubled 
heart teach me much more. I have returned to my 
beginning. I realize that if through science I can seize 
phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot for all that 
apprehend the world. Were I to trace its entire relief 
with my finger, I should not know any more. And you give 
me the choice between a description that is sure but 
teaches me nothing and hypotheses that claim to teach me 
but are not sure. A stranger to myself and to the world, 
armed solely with a thought that negates itself as soon 
as it asserts, what is this condition in which I can have 
peace only by refusing to know and to live, in which 
appetite for conquest bumps into walls that defy its 
assaults?...
Everything is ordered in such a way as to bring into 
being that poisoned peace produced by thoughtlessness, 
lack of heart and fatal renunciations.
Camus.A., The Myth of Sisyphus 
Middlesex: London (1942) 1975 pp.24-25.
1INTRODUCTION
As shadows lengthen over academe, I sit before its 
pillars, preoccupied by dusky images that will not 
materialize.
The format and contents of this extended essay do 
not readily ’fit’ into the traditional agenda of 
International Relations. Yet, Metamorphosis1 does 
address this agenda, but in a wholly iconoclastic manner. 
The style, composition and conclusions - or lack thereof 
- have been consciously produced to continually challenge 
and provoke the reader, so as to try and fracture the 
natural order of things, and insert the intractable 
subjective commitments by scholars - to various politics 
and beliefs - into the framework of analysis.
By so doing, I hope to show that the phenomena that 
the scholar studies are in no way raw or pristine in 
nature - nor are they studied ’objectively’ in 
themselves; rather, such phenomena are already 
categorized before the scholar even sees them. That is, 
most scholars within the field compare and contrast new 
phenomena to a pre-existent deposit of faith that informs 
and sustains the scholar in the belief that what he or 
she ’sees’ is the Truth or Reality.
1 The title of my thesis - Metamorphosis and Other 
Stories - is taken from the 1961 Penguin collection of 
Kafka’s stories. Kafka.F., Metamorphosis and Other 
Stories Middlesex: Penguin (1916) 1961
2Metamorphosis alludes to a complete break with this 
traditional mode and form of knowledge that has created 
and sustained the analysis of International Relations 
since its inception. Its intellectual reference point 
can be found in the genre of the postmodern, as will be 
noted by the authors who are forwarded in the margins of 
this essay. Its aim is not to attack individual scholars 
from various schools of thought, which are generally 
accepted as legitimate within International Relations, 
for this form of argument - even if successful - proves 
to be only incremental, facile and diversionary, as well 
as wholly unsatisfying. Rather, it perceives current 
scholars and schools within International Relations as 
having common ontological foundations, which vary only by 
degree, and thereby argues that it is the foundations 
which should be attacked so as to de-struct the current 
boundaries of International Relations.
Though this essay has a general theme, one should 
not make the mistake of thinking that it is about a 
single numinous theme. I am more drawn to preludes than 
conclusions; this tends to have an anti-linear 
consequence, which tends to decry ’solutions’, ’proof’ 
and the provision of ’answers’, and tends to herald 
’questions’, ’possibilities’ and heuristic
3’understanding’. This essay then (from the French essai, 
an attempt), is simply that - an attempt to order one’s 
impressions, reflections and understanding on a given 
subject.
4METAMORPHOSIS
As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dreams 
he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic 
insect. He was lying on his hard, as it were armour- 
plated, back and when he lifted his head a little he 
could see his dome-like brown belly divided into stiff 
arched segments on top of which the bed quilt could 
hardly keep in position and was about to slide off 
completely. His numerous legs, which were pitifully thin 
compared to the rest of his bulk, waved helplessly before 
his eyes.
What happened to me? he thought. It was no dream. 
His room, a regular human bedroom, only rather too small, 
lay quiet between the four familiar walls....
Gregorfs eyes turned to the next window - one could 
hear the raindrops beating on the window gutter - it made 
him quite melancholy. What about sleeping a little 
longer and forgetting all this nonsense, he thought, but 
it could not be done, for he was accustomed to sleeping 
on his right side and in his present condition he could 
not turn himself over. However violently he forced 
himself towards his right side he always rolled onto his 
back again.2
So Kafka begins his story Metamorphosis. So it may 
also metaphorically signify the end of a tradition of 
scholarship in International Relations that has never 
been able to escape the context of its own beginnings. 
These beginnings emerged from the aftermath of the First 
World War,3 and gained coherence and structure during the
2 Kafka.F., 1961 op. cit. p.9.
3 Some argue that the study of International Relations
goes back many centuries, and incorporates thinkers such 
as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Clausewitz - for 
instance, see Parkinson.F., The Philosophy of 
International Relations: A Study in the History of 
Thought London: Sage 1977 - but I assert that this 
resemblance is merely a simulacrum, which has been 
generated by a tradition in which scholars, at various 
times, have noted similarities. These various references 
to similarities have then been discovered by a new 
generation of researchers, as if they were paring away 
some palimpsestic parchment, and finally pronouncing that 
they have proof that the link is obvious and concrete. 1
argue though, that they have been unsuccessful in their 
attempt, for all they have found is that other scholars,
5inter-war years. As the Second World War loomed large, 
E.H. Carr4 seemed to galvanize the debate and philosophy 
of the time, striking accord with many, and in the 
process, largely setting out the legitimized categories 
by which debate and analysis are still carried out today.
"Realism" versus "Liberalism"/"Utopianism", ’human 
nature’ versus ’harmony of interest’, ’appeasement’ 
versus ’consensus’ - these types of categorizations, 
based on ’rational choice theory’ and ’enlightened self- 
interest’, have dominated scholarship much to the 
detriment of other modes of analysis. This has been 
partly due to the need to maintain a strong boundary 
between the ’discipline’ of International Relations and 
other ’disciplines’. There seems to be a persistent 
perception that without a strong academic boundary and a
strong adherence to a.m.e..th.Q..d that differentiates
International Relations from other ’disciplines’, the 
legitimation for scholarship in this area will crumble. 
However, with the success of Interdisciplinary Studies 
generally, this perception does not seem to be warranted.
This fear though, may have a subjective political 
basis if one looks closely at the make-up of the scholars 
within such departments. The overwhelming number of 
those studying International Relations have a Political
at various times, have attempted to legitimate their 
theses by attempting to validate it with reference to the 
PAST.
4 Carr.E.H., The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 
London: Macmillan (1939) 1946 2nd Ed.
6Science or Economics background. It may well be that the 
persistent narrowness of analysis stems from the 
realization that to open the field would entail a loss of 
prestige and jobs for those specialities that now 
dominate it.
It has also been partly due to the fierceness of the 
debate within the field,5 which has generated a myopic 
ideological tendency that does not readily accept ideas 
and assertions outside the received deposit of faith. By 
deposit of faith I imply a series of written and oral 
assumptions that have been passed down and added to over 
the decades to form a tradition of scholarship - or 
privileged way of seeing. That is, the texts and ideas 
produced by scholars, through time, under the umbrella of 
"International Relations", formed perceptions and 
conceptions of how the ’world’ was - and is - and thus, 
how the ’world’ could be controlled.
I do not so much mean "controlled" in the sense of
using the deposit as a basis for military or economic
domination by nations, rather, I am primarily using the
word "controlled" to argue that the deposit generates,
and then projects, what the ’world’ IS. Thus notions,
such as ’chaos’, ’anarchy’ or ’universal human nature’
for example, do not objectively exist in the ’world’, but
5 First between "realists" and "idealists"; then between 
"realists" and "behaviouralists"; and then - in a 
triangular conflict - between "realists" and 
"structuralists/marxists", and what Banks terms 
"pluralists". Banks.M., ’Where Are We Now’, in Review of 
International Studies 1985 11:3:220-237.
7instead, are projected from the deposit to explain (or 
explain away) other social contexts that scholars have 
little experience of; or, have difficulty in coping with 
from within a ’Western’ deposit of faith that is based on 
assumptions of Enlightenment rationality and enlightened 
’self’-interest.
The ’other social contexts" I referred to above is 
deliberately vague, as opposed to the concentration on 
nation states, or international organizations, or 
centralized modes of domestic political power that those 
within the ’discipline’ of International Relations 
perceive. By using the term "other social contexts" I am 
trying to avoid the convenient labels and systems of 
classification that have been deployed by those within 
the ’discipline’ to give a sense of permanence (or at 
least repetition) to the phenomena they study. To assume 
time-honoured typologies, like a ’level-of-analysis’ 
distinction for example, or a utilitarian account of 
rational action, is to prefigure and prejudge a problem 
and its solution.
My notion of "other social contexts" revolves around 
the creation and maintenance of modes of identity. 
Identity is contingent in both time and space, and can be 
very complex as individuals and groups can have multiple 
poles of identity. Identity can be manifest in the 
state, or in international organizations, etc., but it 
can also be manifest in a myriad of other forms that have
8a religious, or historical, or racial, or ethnic, or 
gender, or geographic, or socio-economic base, etc..
The manifestation of a particular social context can 
not be labelled, classified and identified pre-existent 
to its manifestation; and can only be understood in terms 
of its manifestation - ie., in terms of the pressures and 
forces that drove people to actively identify and create 
a new pole of identity. This can not be done using a 
deposit of faith that is itself a mechanism for adherents 
to identify themselves, the ’world’, and how to act in 
that ’world’. I would argue that the only way to 
understand these other social contexts is study them from 
within the crucible (deposit of faith) that forms their 
identity, not from within the crucible that forms one’s 
own identity.
The social context of the ’discipline’ of 
International Relations was born of the need for 
’security’ between the nations of Europe. The 
generational change that has occurred under its banner as 
this century has worn on, has attempted to ’deepen’ its 
philosophical and theoretical base by ’discovering’ a 
’state’s system’, ’international relations’, etc. 
throughout the ’history of the world’. This search for 
origins - and thus permanence or repetition - has give 
scholars in the ’discipline’ a basis to then project the 
original concern for European state security into a 
concern for ’world security’ based on a state system.
9The projection of concerns for a European state 
security system at a particular point in time onto the 
’world’ - past, present and future - has reified the 
analytical process, and given it an ideological and 
totalizing tendency. It has had the practical 
consequence of invalidating alternate forms of knowledge 
and identity formation. For instance, other nations, 
cultures, regions, histories and religious manifestations 
are not ’objectively’ described and analysed by the 
’discipline’, as scholars might hope or believe. Rather, 
alternate forms of knowledge - or alternate ways of 
seeing - are reified out of their context, because they 
are interpreted in relation to a pre-existent deposit of 
faith that has been assumed - or agreed upon a priori - 
as being correct. The consequence of this is that other 
social contexts are not analysed in themselves; rather, 
they are analysed - and their legitimacy ascertained - in 
relation to pre-set categories, which have an internal 
bias toward a particular way of seeing.
The deposit of faith is used as an analytical tool 
to reveal or reduce the true nature of things to an 
essence. The question that scholars working within the 
confines of this deposit of faith - or attempting to gain 
legitimacy for their theses by endeavouring to link them 
back into this deposit of faith - should ask is whether 
their conclusions express a Truth about some essential 
aspect of a proto-reality. Or does such analysis, using
10
a deposit of faith that is strictly circumscribed, bring 
the illusion of Truth into being? My call for a complete 
break with the tradition of International Relations - a 
metamorphosis - is on the basis that the ’discipline’ has 
failed to explain what it promises. Instead, it 
primarily treats the phenomena of the field as an 
explanation, or a reiteration, of the deposit of faith - 
ie., of, in the first instance, a concern for state 
security.
This does not imply any notion of bad faith on the
part of the scholars within the field, in which they
knowingly ’lie’ or ’cheat’. Rather, it implies that the
deposit of faith, and the tradition as a whole, cradles
the scholar, and gives the scholar a foundation on which
to believe in a natural order of things. Berger, in
perhaps one of his best observations, notes:
...very few people, and even they only in 
regard to fragments of their world-view, are in 
a position to re-evaluate what has thus been 
imposed upon them. They actually feel no need 
for reappraisal because the world-view into 
which they have been socialized appears self- 
evident to them. Since it is also regarded by 
almost everyone they are likely to deal with in 
their own society, the world-view is self­
validating. Its ’proof’ lies in the reiterated 
experience of other men [sic] who take it for 
granted also.6
6 Berger.P., Invitation to Sociology 
Middlesex: Penguin (1963) 1966 p.136.
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Consider this somewhat anecdotal example:
What does one see first - a rabbit, a duck, a god, or 
some scribble on a page? How new phenomena are 
interpreted will depend on the experiences and perceptual 
norms that are considered valid before they are first 
seen.
From this point of view, the reality of 
differentiated modes of historical and cultural context 
is unimportant; what matters is the continuing validity 
of the deposit of faith. I argue though, that there is 
no essence to be revealed, and no timeless foundation on 
which such a deposit of faith can be fixed. I am not 
arguing here for a solipsistic view of reality, nor am I 
arguing for what has become known as nihilistic 
relativism. I generally agree with Bloor and Barnes’ 
notion that ’reality is a common factor in all the vastly
12
different cognitive responses that men [sic] produce to 
it’.7 I also generally agree with scholars, such as Lee, 
who argues:
...a given society not only codifies
experienced reality through the use of specific 
language and other patterned behaviour
characteristics of his [sic] culture, but. . . he 
actually grasps reality only as it is presented 
to him in this code. The assumption is not 
that reality is relative; rather that it is 
differently punctuated and categorized, or
presented to the participants of different 
cultures differently. If reality itself were 
not absolute, then true communication of course 
would not be possible.8
The implication of my argument then, manifests the 
perception that the deposit of faith in International 
Relations is used to legitimate, define, and maintain a 
particular state or structure of things in relation to 
itself - as opposed to a view that sees the deposit as 
alluding to inexorable truths that impound upon an 
’objective’ universal humanity.9 In this way the deposit
1 Bloor.D. & Barnes.B., ’Relativism, Rationality and the 
Sociology of Knowledge’, in Hollis.M. & Lukes.S.(ed), 
Rationality and Relativism Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1982 p.34.
8 Lee.D., Freedom and Culture
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1959 p,105.
9 By "universal humanity”, I imply that it can be of a 
positive or negative form. For instance, a positive form 
can be perceived in "liberal" notions of ’universal human 
nature’, or ’universal human rights*. In contrast, the 
negative form is manifest by scholars, such as Waltz, who 
argue that it is the anarchy of the international system 
that produces ’state behaviour’, not any allusion to a 
’universal human nature’. Waltz’s argument though, from 
the basis of "anarchy", is not an argument that is 
proposing that there is not a universal humanity; rather, 
it is an argument that is seeded by the essence of a 
universal human nature that is corrupt or degenerate. 
Thus, Waltz’s argument is merely a negative form of a 
universal humanity. See Waltz.K.N., ’Political Philosophy 
and the Study of International Relations’, in
13
of faith, and the tradition as a whole, can be seen as 
utilizing a circular logic that is self-perpetuating, and 
resistant to ’outside’ influence; and the over-riding 
concern of the scholar becomes myopic - focussing on the 
need to gain legitimacy through linkage to that central 
deposit of faith, not to the particular aspect that he or 
she is studying in itself.
By being resistant to other forms of analysis that 
don’t readily fit into the established norms, this way of 
seeing has increasingly become dislocated from the 
general trend of scholarship elsewhere. The 
Enlightenment Project - Reason, Progress, Natural Law, 
History, Knowledge, Truth, the Subject-Object dichotomy, 
objective and value-free scholarship that is manifest in 
the epistemological turn, and Universal Humanity 
(harmonious or harmful) - has increasingly come into 
question when its foundations have been more closely 
analysed. The state of modernity has been thrown into 
question, and with it all notions of universal certainty. 
Yet, like old-time believers, those within the field of 
International Relations have largely been faithful to 
their tradition - that which was formed when notions of 
the modern still reigned.
Fox.T.R.(ed), Theoretical Aspects of International 
Relations Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 
1959.
14
This is not just some dry academic bitch, for it has 
real existential consequences. The overwhelming number 
of those in governmental bureaucracies, collection and 
information agencies, think tanks, etc., who serve the 
political process in various nations, have been taught 
and trained to perceive the world using the categories of 
the Enlightenment Project. International Relations 
Departments, and their way of seeing, have been an 
integral stepping-stone along the bureaucratic way.10 
If, as I contend, there are serious problems with this 
way of seeing, then I also argue that governmental ways 
of seeing are also deficient. The existential cost is 
paid daily around the world for poor analysis that stems 
from grand-theory - whose assumptions tend toward an 
ideological reductionism - and whose conclusions are 
usually too reified to be useful.
10 Consider Vasquez’s comprehensive study, which argues 
that political "realism" is still the dominant way of 
seeing in International Relations; or, Rosenau, et al., 
who found that Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations was 
the most widely used course text in International 
Relations; or, Alker & Biersteker’s study of 17 
International Relations Departments, which found that 70% 
of all texts were in the "realist" tradition.
Vasquez.J.A., The Power of Power Politics: A Critique 
London: Frances Pinter 1983. Rosenau.J.N. et al., ’Of 
Syllabi, Texts, Students, and Scholarship in 
International Relations: Some Data and Interpretations on 
the State of a Burgeoning Field’, in World Politics 1977 
29:2:263-341. Alker.H.R. & Biersteker.T.J., ’The 
Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future 
Archeologist of International Savoir Faire’, in 
International Studies Quarterly 1984 28:2:121-142.
15
As long as each plays by the established rules of 
’rational choice’ and ’national interest’ there will be 
no problems - for they are merely reproducing the 
theoretical foundation they have been trained to see.
The problem is though, that it is not uncommon to hear 
functionaries within various agencies of government 
appeal to the of their ’foe’; the ’rules’
have been broken, and ’national interest’ does not seem a 
primary concern. The official ending of the cold-war 
will only exacerbate the dislocation that is now 
sometimes felt - for the old models and certainties can 
no longer, by definition, have any consequence. Perhaps 
it is appropriate at this time then - more than probably 
at any other point in the whole history of International 
Relations - that scholars working within the field should 
pronounce their ’discipline’ exanimate, rejoice in a 
metamorphosis, and invoke new ways of seeing.
The difficulty is, however, that I believe an 
invocation of new ways of seeing will be nearly 
impossible from within the field, for there is both a 
political investment, and a commitment to belief in the 
truth of the tradition. The political investment is 
monetary and existential - a scholar’s livelihood is 
based on the legitimacy of the knowledge and experience 
he or she holds. If that commodity of knowledge and 
experience appears to be threatened with redundancy, the 
tendency is not to abandon one’s privileged knowledge-
16
base and incorporate new ways of seeing, but to buttress 
the old, increasing the improbability of change. With 
this process goes an increased commitment in the belief 
of the tradition and its precepts, whereby dogmatism 
tends to prevail. I thus herald Metamorphosis - a 
complete break with past tradition, and a dissolution of 
the deposit of faith that, now at least, poorly 
reiterates the realities that are present.
17
Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to expand on 
why I have focussed on the ’discipline’ of International 
Relations as a whole, and not on the various schools or 
perspectives within it. For it has been strongly 
asserted elsewhere that, historically, as well as 
philosophically, these perspectives - to varying degrees 
- are in opposition to one another. Consider Dougherty 
and Pfaltzgraff’s Contending Theories of International 
Relations;11 or, Smith, Little and Shackleton’s 
Perspectives on World Politics;12 or, Banks’ ’General 
Theory in International Relations’.13 They all argue 
that the varying perspectives have characteristics that 
clearly distinguish them from one another.
Even within a perspective - such as "realism" - 
there are a plethora of differences. Ashley maintains 
that he can perceive a difference between what he terms 
"classical realism" and "technical realism"
[behaviourally based]. He argues that "classical 
realism" is interpretative, seif-reflective and non- 
deterministic - as opposed to "technical realism", which 
he sees as a regression from the "classical realism" of
II
11 Dougherty.J.E. & Pfaltzgraff.R.L. Contending Theories 
of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey New 
York: Harper & Row 2nd Ed. 1981.
12 Smith.M. , Little.R. & Shackleton.M .(ed ) , Perspectives 
on World Politics London: Croom Helm 1981.
13 Banks.M., ’General Theory in International Relations: 
New Directions’, in Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 1979 8:3:252-266.
18
thinkers such as Herz and Morgenthau.14 Keohane argues
for a distinction between "structural realism" and
"classical realism", on the basis that the nature of the
world-system has changed since the precepts of "classical
realism" were formulated. He thus argues that
"structural realism" can better explain present reality
more effectively than "classical realism" - for it does
not need to rely on outmoded "state-centric" models, and
can give a more creative role to international
organizations in an inter-dependent world.15 Moreover,
Smith argues that an eclectic variety of postulates are
used to legitimate the genre of "realism":
...closer examination of individual writers 
reveals a wide range of fundamental postulates 
claimed to support these assumptions. Realism 
can appear as theological dogma, applied social 
theory, diplomatic pragmatism, political 
science, or philosophy of history. As a 
result, it can be unclear whether one is dealing with a theory, a doctrine, or merely an 
approach to difficult international problems.16
14 Ashley.R.K., ’Political Realism and Human Interests’, 
in International Studies Quarterly 1981 25:2:204-236; 
specifically p.221.
15 Keohane.R.0., ’Theory of World Politics: Structuralism 
and Beyond’, in Finifter.A.W.(ed), Political Science: The 
State of the Discipline Washington: American Political 
Science Association 1984,
See also - Keohane.R.O. & Nye.J.S, ’Realism and Complex 
Interdependence’, in Smith.M., 1981 et al.(ed), pp.120- 
131; and Keohane.R.O. & Nye.J.S., ’Transgovernmental 
Relations and International Organizations’, in World 
Politics 1974 27:1:39-62. - for earlier forms of the same 
theme.
16 Smith.M.J., Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 1986 p.3.
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With such a wide consensus among scholars - in the 
perception that there are substantive differences 
between, and within, perspectives and approaches - my 
assertion that these different strands have a common 
ontological foundation seems weak - if not anachronistic. 
Yet in response, I do accept that different perspectives 
exist - at least normatively; and I accept that these 
various perspectives utilize different variables and have 
different foci and aims, which in turn produce different 
outcomes. This acceptance though, does not entail the 
corollary that is assumed by scholars such as Smith (see 
fn.15), ie., that such perspectives have different 
ontological foundations.
Consider Banks’ very informative article, ’The 
Inter-Paradigm Debate’,17 in which he defines three 
different strands of analysis - "realism", "pluralism" 
and "structuralism". Banks defines these different 
strands as "paradigms", adding that ’each of the three 
starts with a wholly different basic image’.18 He goes 
on to point out:
Upon these contrasting foundations, the
proponents of each paradigm have erected a 
structure of theory. Each of the three is 
coherent in its own terms, but each also 
contradicts the others. The contradictions are 
most distinctive in relation to the major 
theoretical categories of actors, dynamics and 
dependent variables. On actors, realists see 
only states; pluralists see states in
17 Banks.M., ’The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in Light.M. & 
Groom.A.J.R.(ed), International Relations: A Handbook of 
Current Theory London: Pinter 1985 pp.7-26.
18 ibid. p .12 .
20
combination with a great variety of others; and 
structuralists see classes. On dynamics,
realists see force as primary; pluralists see 
complex social movements; structuralists see 
economics. On dependent variables, realists 
see the task of IR as simply to explain what 
states do; pluralists see it more grandly as an 
effort to explain all major events; and 
structuralists see its function as showing why 
the world contains such appalling contrasts 
between rich and poor.19
Again, in the above passage one finds a strong argument
for the acceptance of the notion that the different
perspectives within International Relations have
different foundations or ontologies. Yet, after these
strong introductory remarks on comparing "paradigms", one
finds Banks’ more detailed remarks (below) on each
specific "paradigm" far less strident.
Banks first assesses the "realist paradigm",
concluding with two interesting observations. His first
conclusion is that the bitter debate between "realists"
and "idealists" was one within a single "paradigm" -
having the same ontological base.
Realists share the state-centric paradigm with 
the idealists, their opposite numbers in the 
realist-idealist debate. Idealism is also
found, of course, among advocates of each of 
the competing paradigms. But it is most easily 
recognized among those who agree with the 
realists about the nature of the problems posed 
by world politics while disagreeing with them 
about what should be done in response. Whereas 
realists deploy deeply conservative doctrines, 
arguing for example that powerful states should 
take direct responsibility for world order and 
that reform is not just impracticable but 
positively dangerous, idealists proceed to 
liberal doctrines; for them, power can be 
tamed. They advocate progressive reform, via 
such devices as disarmament, collective
19 ibid, pp.12-13.
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security, strengthened law, sanctions against 
aggressors, and even - potentially - world 
government. All this is based on the same 
primary ingredients of theory as those found on 
the realists theoretical menu: sovereignty,
power and diplomacy.20
The second interesting conclusion Banks makes on his 
assessment of "realism” is that the "behaviouralists’" 
attack on the "realist paradigm" in the 1950’s - which 
was first perceived by scholars at that time as a 
conclusive rejection of "realism" - was only an attack on 
methodology, and not on the "paradigm" itself. Banks 
concludes, ’the behavioural efforts in qualification, 
simulation and even theory-building mainly proceeded from 
realist assumptions throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s’.21 
Banks’ conclusions - which differ markedly from the 
earlier assessments of scholars, that generally 
reiterated fundamental differences between "realism" and 
"idealism", and "realism" and "behaviouralism" - offer a 
window of opportunity for the reintroduction of my 
argument: that, not only do "realism", "idealism" and
"behaviouralism" have a common foundation, but, that at a 
deeper level, all Banks’ operating "paradigms" have a 
common ontological foundation.
Banks’ "pluralist paradigm" is differentiated from 
the "realist paradigm" by the premise ’that the world is 
highly complex’.22 This assumption ’presents the world 
as [a] multi-centric rather than state-centric or global-
20 ibid. p.15.
21 ibid. p.14 .
22 ibid. p.16.
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centric, system of relationships’.23 This gloss on the 
word "complex" hides the operational or normative nature 
of the "paradigm".
Consider Banks’ sentiments in relation to 
"international political economy" - which Banks contends 
is a major "sub-field" of the "pluralist" "paradigm". He 
notes that ’the majority’ of the scholars in this field 
’favour a "modified realist" view’ of the world; but he 
maintains a facade of difference between "realism" and 
"pluralism" on the basis that scholars within the "sub­
field" of "international political economy" have failed 
to perceive ’the illogicality of their unwillingness to 
face the fundamental implications of their work’.24 I 
suspect that what Banks thinks ought to be, or should be, 
is the basis of his "paradigm" differentiation, rather 
than his assertion that the "paradigms" are 
differentiated on the basis of ontology.
There are differences between Banks’ "realist" and 
pluralist" "paradigms", but they are differences about 
the level of analysis that should prevail, not 
differences about ontological foundation. The perceived 
differences stem from presentation and orientation, 
rather than differences about the genesis of knowledge 
and its maintenance. That is to say that both 




Banks’ "structuralist’* "paradigm" is also defined in
the vaguest of ways: ’Structuralism is used here merely
to distinguish it from realism and pluralism’.25 He
contends that because ’it is not a product of academic
IR’ it is somehow a different "paradigm".26 Yet, he
concedes that ’in common with both the conservative and
idealist strands of state-centric realism, it does draw
upon a heritage of classical theory’.27 Just as
importantly though, he goes on to note:
Once the study of IR became institutionalized 
in universities, most of its professoriate 
regarded structuralist ideas as false, or 
unduly normative, or politically subversive.
And so it has flourished only on the fringes of 
the field, rather than within the conservative 
mainstream.2 8
Alker and Biersteker concur with Banks’ observation, 
adding that the scapegoating of "structuralist" insights 
is especially strong in the United States, where there is 
an internal political bias against anything with Marxist 
undertones.2 9
At no point in Banks’ discussion of the 
"structuralist" "paradigm" does he initiate any dialogue 
over differences in ontological foundation. In fact, he 
agrees that both "realism" and "structuralism" draw on a 
classical foundation (see fn.26). He merely 





29 Alker.H.R. & Biersteker.T.J., 1984 op. cit. p.137.
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ontology - on the basis of internal political comparison. 
"Marxist" motif is very different in aim and outcome from 
"realism", but it has, substantively speaking, much more 
in common with "realism" at an ontological level - as 
Banks concedes. Smith, et al., also generally subscribe 
to this conclusion, noting that ’the orientation [of the 
perspective] is generally reformist but it remains 
essentially a view of the world "from the top down"’.30
Banks, like many others who tend to be grouped in 
his "pluralist" or "structuralist" "paradigms", has seen 
the anomalies of the "realist" tradition, especially when 
that tradition is compared to assumptions and modes of 
analysis utilized in other fields of endeavour. They 
have attempted to correct these anomalies - and in the 
process change "paradigms" - but they have done so not in 
a revolutionary style but in a reformist fashion. They 
have not tried to destroy the deposit of faith, or the 
tradition’s ontological foundation; rather, they have 
proposed incremental changes that have the aim of 
enhancing or enriching the deposit of faith that is 
already present. The resultant outcome in differences of 
aim and method tend to be highlighted - and the 
similarities down-played - so as to induce a belief that 
a "paradigm" shift has been made. I would argue though, 
that no such shift has materialized, only a strengthening 
of the tradition as a whole.
30 Smith.M., et al., 1981 op. cit. p.119.
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The notion of paradigm was introduced by Kuhn in 
1962, whereby he tried to conceptually account for 
revolutionary change in a research programme. In this 
account, he concluded that one of the indicators that a 
scientific revolution had taken place was that all texts 
relating to the paradigm would be completely rewritten to 
reflect the ascendency of the new way of seeing.31 This 
has certainly not been the case within the field of 
International Relations. The same paradigm has reigned 
in the field since its inception. Granted, there has 
been criticism - views have been modified and 
perspectives ’enriched’ - but this criticism has been 
incremental, and ultimately reformist in nature.
It is on the above basis then, that I claim that 
there is a deposit of faith that guides, supports and 
legitimates the tradition as a whole. Its over-arching 
circumscription of what is valid or invalid, true or 
false, encompasses the various strands - and the scholars 
therewithin - in a framework that is built on the 
ontology of the Enlightenment Project - ie., the 
underlying assumptions of Reality - the knowledge of what 
is.
The ontological foundations of the Enlightenment
Project, and the underlying assumptions that predominate
in the ’discipline’ of International Relations (as one of
the custodians of the Enlightenment) tend to centre
31 Kuhn.H., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
Chicago: Chicago University Press 2nd ed. (1962) 1970.
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around universal notions of Progress and Reason. The 
state’s system is the kernel for this notion of Progress 
and Reason in the ’discipline’ of International 
Relations. The state is the catalyst for change from 
backward to advanced, barbaric to civilized, chaotic or 
anarchic to reasoned. The state is also the bulwark 
against the Other - against chaos, anarchy and 
insecurity.
The deposit of faith, and the different "paradigms" 
that exist in the ’discipline’ of International 
Relations, are driven by the same evolutionary teleology 
- that, at least within the state, there can be, and is, 
progress and development toward a better life. All the 
"paradigms" present in International Relations are 
debates about the best way for Progress, Reason and 
Development to take place so that security is assured; 
not about the viability of such terms, and the 
consequences of attaching such terms to the notion of the 
state; and certainly not about why notions of security 
should be primarily attached to the state.
Progress to where? Development to what end? 
Reasonable to whom? Formulations to these answers are 
created in a multitude of social contexts and are acted 
out in a myriad of different ways. To assume a priori 
that communities perceive progress, development, reason 
and security in a universal and similar fashion - and to 
presume they do it only in terms of the state - is to, I
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would argue, reify and mystify the whole process of 
trying to understand.
So, while I agree with the general statements of
scholars, such as Bozeman - who asserts that:
In the absence of a common language, a common 
pool of memories, and shared ways of thinking, 
reasoning and communicating, it is hard to 
fathom a ’world culture’ (or for that matter a 
’world history’), at least if one takes ideas 
seriously. The evidence points instead to a 
plurality of frames of reference;32
or Hoffman - who highlights the fundamental weakness of
this tradition of International Relations, and manifests
the ’depth of faith’ - which entails ’a conviction that
there is, in each area, a kind of masterkey - not merely
intellectual, but an operational paradigm’,33 I do not
agree with the intellectual foundation34 of their
enterprise, which is the same as that which they are
attempting to undermine. There is an element of bad
faith, or naivete, to those who assume privileged access
to the world in itself, without reflexively analysing
32 Bozeman.A., ’The International Order in a 
Multicultural World’, in Bull.H. & Watson.A .(ed), The 
Expansion of International Society Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1984 pp.387-406; specifically p.391.
33 Hoffman.S., ’An American Social Science: International
Relations’, in Daedalus 1977 106:3:41-60; specifically
p . 4 5 .
34 The notion of "foundation" has been blurred, due to it 
taking on subtle variations of meaning in a variety of 
different fields. I use the notion of "foundation" here, 
and throughout my essay, as meaning an essentialist 
foundation - which I expressly disagree with. This is in 
contrast to my belief that there are ’foundations’, but 
they depend of the linguistic and historical context in 
which they are formed, and while the adherents of this or 
that form may believe in an essentialist foundation, I 
believe that they are contextually contingent.
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their own assumptions. This is the primary reason for 
arguing that scholars, such as Bozeman and Hoffman, 
belong to a common tradition of scholarship within 
International Relations, even though they largely do not 
agree with that tradition.
The differences between normative strands - or 
perspectives - are differences within a genre; and the 
differences between scholars of different strands35 - and 
the differences between scholars within a strand36 - are 
differences of degree, aim and outcome, not ontology. I 
believe it is a misreading by those within the field to 
squabble over the intentions of this or that author - and 
squabble over what "realism", or "structuralism", or 
"liberalism" is or isn’t. For this, in itself, presumes 
privileged access into positivistic inter-subjectivity, 
History, Reality and Truth - the very stuff of modernity. 
It is my assertion that this has been the mistake of 
those who are attempting a "paradigm" shift within the 
field. They have been enmeshed in the sticky morass of 
author and text - of linkage back into the deposit of 
faith - which has effectively circumscribed their field
35 For example, the differences between Morgenthau.H .J., 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle For Power and Peace 
New York: Alfred Knopf (1948) 1985; Mitrany.D.A., Working 
Peace System Chicago: Quadrangle 1966; and, Galtung.J., 
The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective New York: 
Free Press 1980.
36 For instance the differences between Bull.H.N., The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order London: 
Macmillan 1977; Waltz.K.N., Man, the State, and War: A 
Theoretical Analysis New York: Columbia University Press 
1959; and, Neibuhr.R., Moral Man and Immoral Society New 
York: Charles Scribner & Sons 1932.
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of vision. Mesmerized by concerns of legitimacy, funding 
and status, the outcome has evolved from one of 
revolution without, to one of reform within.
The ’discipline’ endures, baked and crumbling within 
the enervated deposit of faith it has fashioned for 
itself - and the echo of "The king is dead, long live the 
king" resounds throughout the scaffolding of the 
firmament. The generational change that has occurred 
within the field has not lead to a "paradigm" shift, as 
perhaps one might expect! Thus, the history of change 
within the field leads me to reassert my earlier 
conclusion - that the invocation of new ways of seeing is 
all but impossible from within the genre; and I again 
reiterate my call for metamorphosis - for a complete 
break with the tradition of International Relations
scholarship.
30
The notion of a single operating paradigm within the 
field of International Relations allows a new conceptual 
schema to be manifest. The purpose of this extended 
essay is to take advantage of this niche, so as to 
fracture the natural order of things, and to amplify - to 
those within the field - the possibility of other ways of 
seeing. The reference point for these new ways of seeing 
is postmodernity; but within this genre there is no 
reliance on a deposit of faith, for there is no 
foundation, no essence. It is characterized not by a 
grand totalizing narrative, but by smaller multiple 
narratives, which don’t seek universalizing stabilization 
or legitimation. Its mode is subversive; its aim is to 
de-naturalize, by destroying the illusion of critical 
distance, privileged access and the use of author and 
text to legitimate knowledge. Plus, it makes use of 
irony and parody in a play of duplicity, in order to 
reflexively undermine any notion that one is, de facto, 
attempting to re-construct a ’new’ form of meta­
narrative .
This essay does not deal with the Enlightenment 
Project in its entirety (whatever "entirety" is!), for it 
has been discussed in various ways by others, such as 
Lyotard,37 Derrida,38 and Foucault.39 Rather, I wish to
37 Lyotard.J-F., The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge Tr. Bennington.G. & Massumi.B., Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press 1984.
38 Derrida.J., Writing and Difference
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reflect on the centralized deposit of faith within the 
field of International Relations - nebulous as it is - 
and its critical function in arbitrating the structures 
of the real. Within the context of this specific story,
I again want to highlight its crucial role in sustaining 
scholars’ faith in their privileged access to History and 
Reality.
This extended essay form is ideal to characterize 
the problematic nature of scholarship within the current 
International Relations framework, as well as to 
highlight, for scholars within the field, new avenues of 
knowledge-format ion based on a framework of subversion 
and difference. To this end, this story is an example of 
problematizing the basis of knowledge-format ion and 
maintenance within the ’discipline’ of International 
Relations. Its aim is to de-naturalize the textuality of 
knowledge within the field, by telling of the 
problematic nature of author and text, subjective and 
historical transparency, and the construction of the 
autonomous sign.
Tr. Bass.A., Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1978. 
39 See Foucault.M., The Archaeology of Knowledge and the 
Discourse on Language Tr. Sheridan Smith.A.M., New York: 
Pantheon 1972; Foucault.M., ’What Is Enlightenment?’, in 
Rabinow.P.(ed), The Foucault Reader Tr. Porter.C., New 
York: Pantheon 1984; and, Foucault.M., ’What Is An 
Author?’, in Bouchard.D.(ed), Language, Counter-Memory 
and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews Tr. 
Bouchard.D. & Simon.S., Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
1977.
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Shultz and Luckmann point out:
The main characteristics of a complex social 
distribution of knowledge are ’inequality’ in 
the distribution of general knowledge, 
progressive partitioning and specialization of 
special knowledge into various, more or less 
’autonomous’ provinces, and the corresponding 
institutional specialization of the
transmission of special knowledge.40
They were implying that there is, in complex societies, a
structural bias toward the manifestation of autonomous
research programmes - that are resistant to outside
conjecture. I have termed this autonomous epoche a
deposit of faith; and I assert that while there may well
be a structural bias toward its formation and
maintenance, one must resist its seductive qualities -
for they reify the whole enterprise. The transmission
and maintenance of special knowledge, through adjuration
to a deposit of faith, relies on several literary skills
that have been derived through the textualization of the
phenomena that the scholar of International Relations
attempts to analyse. Among these, the footnote is still
the central mode by which beiievability is procured.
The paratextuality of the footnote aims at
legitimizing a current thesis by reference to other
authors and texts which concur with a particular view of
reality. This process of linkage though, allows the
scholar to validate and legitimate a thesis because it
adheres to the rules and practices that are operational
40 Shultz.A. & Luckmann.T., The Structures of the Life 
World London: Hienemann Educational 1974; specifically 
p.315.
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within the deposit of faith - not because the thesis 
refers to phenomena in themselves. The footnote projects 
the perception that the scholar has unmediated access to 
History and Reality. This is done by reference to 
something that is outside the proposed thesis - something 
that is considered ’objective’. It functions 
centripetally, so as to reassure the reader of the 
historical credibility of the proposed thesis, as well as 
functioning centrifugally, so as to orientate the reader 
to the reality that looms outside the text. I would 
argue though, that the scholar only has access to re­
presentations of reality, which involve the political, 
moral, ethical and philosophical predilections of others.
The footnote does not refer to the real, but to 
other texts, which are assumed to be the legitimate proxy 
of the real. The deposit of faith within International 
Relations is a receptacle for these sanctified texts, 
which function as the discursive manifestation of 
Knowledge, Truth and Reality - through acts of consensus 
and comparison. It is the texts within this deposit 
which orientate scholars within the field to believe they 
have privileged access to special knowledge. Scholars 
utilize, and comment upon other texts and authors, rather 
than the phenomenological aspect they are attempting to 
analyse. The network of citation becomes an end in 
itself, whereby the study becomes a study of texts, and a 
study of authors; it manifests a structural vista that
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hides the process of interpretation. The denial of this 
act of interpretation leads to a kind of fetishizing of 
the archive, making it a substitute for knowledge of 
Reality. The footnote’s paratextual, authenticating role 
therefore becomes an ironic one, because what it 
incorporates is not any actual fragment of the real 
referent, but its textualized representation. Thus, the 
conventionally presumed authority of the footnote form 
and content is rendered questionable, if not totally 
undermined.
The fetishizing of the text also leads to a 
fetishizing of the author as the point of unity. Through 
this fetishizing, the author becomes the existential 
embodiment of Truth. The process of citation embeds in 
the scholar’s mind the notion of author as authority; 
and, the archeologist of knowledge (the analytical 
scholar) becomes - seemingly by a process of programmatic 
fact - the vessel of legitimated authoritative 
interpretation. The author - as the Teller of Truth - is 
deemed to be a unique vessel of insight; and, in this 
way, becomes the second pillar (the first being the text) 
in which the notion of knowledge and Reality are 
materially manifest. When asked though, "what the basis 
for a scholar’s claim to special insight is?” the answer 
usually revolves around xaffi^ÄOCÄS to many years of 
research (deferral to texts); or, to the writing of books 
and articles that have the approval of the scholar’s
peers (deferral to texts again); or, to direct
experience of the particular aspect of reality that the
scholar is involved with. The first two explanations
defer their claim of privileged access to the text. In
this context, the pillars of author and text set up a
system of circular referentiality - where the dusky
images of Knowledge, Truth and Reality never materialize
The third - the notion of direct experience - is the
crucible for the first two, for it gives the essential
component of ’flesh and blood’ - ie., existential belief
- to an enterprise that would otherwise be dismissed as
game; or, perhaps worse - ideology.
The notion of direct experience rests on the belief
of the ’Individual" - sui generis. That is, it assumes
that the "Individual" - as autonomous subject (ie.,
scholar) - can ’objectively’ discern reality, without
reference to a third, legitimizing body, by using his or
her own natural capacity to reason. This belief in the
autonomous subject emerged as part of the process of the
Enlightenment. Ullmann points out that before the
emergence of the "individual" as a category of self-
ref erentiality, there was only:
...the theory that the individual did not exist 
for his [sic] own sake, but for the sake of the 
whole society....[The] individual was so 
infinitesimally small a part that his interests 
could easily be sacrificed at the altar of 
public good, at the altar of society itself,
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because nothing was more dangerous to society 
than the corrosion and undermining of the very 
element which held it together, that is, its 
faith.41
In the process of the enlightenment, the change in 
the status of the "Individual” emerged from a conflict 
over who held the true deposit of faith. The Church 
argued that God was the final arbiter; and the Church, as 
the holder of the keys to the kingdom, possessed the only 
legitimate body of exegetical truth about the world. The 
emerging opposition to the Church’s truth claims - those 
who belonged to ’the science of reason’ - were sceptical 
of truth claims based on eschatological verification; 
they wanted objective proof of the world in itself, and 
they believed that they, in themselves, possessed the 
dispassionate logical rationality to carry out the task. 
For instance, take the anecdote of the mathematician 
Laplace, who, when he was asked by Napoleon where God 
fitted into his theory of celestial mechanics, was 
reported to have said, ’Sire, I have no need of such an 
hypothesis’. Hobsbawn notes that, ’if there was a 
flourishing religion among the late eighteenth century 
elite, it was rationalist, illuminist, and anti-clerical 
Freemasonary’ .4 2
The prize of the enlightenment - the industrial 
revolution - was a catalyst for expanding what were 
elitist notions of rationality, to encompass an exploding
41 Ullmann.W., The Individual in Society in the Middle 
Ages London: Methuen 1967 p.32,40.
42 Hobsbawn.E.J., The Age of Revolution 
New York: Mentor 1962 p.258.
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middle class. Carr argues that ’the most far-reaching 
social consequence of the industrial revolution has been 
the progressive increase in the number of those who learn 
to think, to use their reason’. He further argues that 
’the rationalization of production means something far 
more important - the rationalization of man [sic]’.43 
The notion of the autonomous subject became entrenched as 
a taken-for-granted entity; especially in the 
’university" , where rational science became a corner­
stone of the academic’s enterprise. In the field of 
International Relations, the notion of the autonomous 
subject (along with the notion of text) is still pivotal 
in sustaining a belief in the "realist", "pluralist", or 
"structuralist" vision; not as the basis of what one 
studies - ie., "individual"-level-of-analysis44 - but, as
43 Carr.E.H., What is History?
Middlesex: Penguin (1961) 1964 p.142-143.
44 As Wolfers highlights: ’...one new theory has placed
individual human beings in the centre of the scene that 
had been previously reserved to the nation states; the 
other emphasized the existence, side by side with the 
state, of other corporate actors, especially 
international organizations...
The ’individuals-as-actors’ approach first appeared in 
the form of what has been called the ’minds-of-men theory 
of international politics’. It was soon to be followed 
by the ’decision-making’ approach. ...It was the aim of 
the new theories to replace the abstract notion of the 
state with the living realities of human minds, wills, 
and hearts. But the result, on the whole, was to 
substitute one set of abstractions for another, because, 
in politics, it is also an abstraction to examine the 
individual apart from the corporate bodies by means of 
which he [sic] acts politically’. Wolfers.A., ’The 
actors in International Relations’, in Fox.W .T.R.(ed), 
Theoretical Aspects of International Relations Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1959 p.84.
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the basis of how one studies - ie., the rational
foundation of privileged access to special knowledge.
There were though, even quite early on, misgivings
about this foundation. Take, for example, the scepticism
of David Hume, who concluded that the notion of an
autonomous subject was a fiction:
...when I enter most intimately into what I 
call ’myself’, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or 
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I can never catch ’myself’, at any 
time without a perception, and never can 
observe anything but perception....
The identity which we ascribe to the mind of 
man [sic] is only a fictitious one, and of a 
like kind with that which we ascribe to 
vegetable and animal bodies. It cannot
therefore have a different origin, but must 
proceed from a like operation of the 
imagination upon like objects.45
E.H. Carr, in What Is History?, has a sense of the
fictitious nature of the "Individual”. Take, for
example, the following passage:
...the fallacy is to suppose that they existed, 
or had any kind of substance, before being 
’brought together’. As soon as we are born, 
the world gets to work on us and transforms us 
from merely biological into social units. 
Every human being at every stage of history or 
pre-history is born into a society and from his 
[sic] earliest years is moulded by that 
society. The language which he speaks is not 
an individual inheritance, but a social 
acquisition from the group in which he grows 
up. Both language and environment help to 
determine the character of his thought; his
45 Hume.D., A Treatise of Human Nature
London: Dent & Sons 1911 Bk,I, Pt.4, pp.239,245.
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earliest ideas come to him from others. As has 
been well said, the individual apart from 
society would be both speechless and 
mindless.4 6
Bernstein argues that there is no direct experience 
of reality. Instead, he argues that there is only 
indirect experience that is shaped and governed through 
the linguistic process:
...different speech systems or codes create for 
their speakers different orders of relevance 
and relation. The experience of the speakers 
may then be transformed by what is made 
significant or relevant by different speech 
systems. As the child learns his [sic] speech, 
or, in terms I shall use here, learns specific 
codes, which regulate his verbal acts, he 
learns the requirements of his social 
structure. The experience of the child is 
transformed by the learning generated by his 
own, apparently voluntary acts of speech. The 
social structure becomes in this way the 
substratum of the child’s experience 
essentially through the manifold consequence of 
the linguistic process. From this point of 
view, every time the child speaks or listens, 
the social structure is reinforced in him and 
his social identity is shaped.47
Bernstein’s argument is a powerful one; and when it 
is combined with Shultz and Luckmann’s notion of 
’autonomous spheres of special knowledge’, this new level 
of signification generates an interesting insight into 
the ’discipline’ of International Relations. For it 
alludes to a realization that the direct experience that 
is claimed by scholars in the field, is actually
46 Carr.E.H., 1961 op. cit. p.31; also, see Lukes.S., 
’Methodological Individualism’, in Emmet.D. &
MacIntyre.A .(ed), Sociological Theory and Philosophical 
Analysis London: Macmillan 1970 pp.76-88.
47 Bernstein.B., ’A Socio-Linguistic Approach to 
Socialization’, in Gumperz.J. & Hymes.D.(ed), Directions 
in Social Linguistics New York: Holt, Rinehart & Wilson 
1970 p.217.
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governed, in large part, by the pre-existent deposit of
faith, which the "scholar" or "specialist" learns and
absorbs as an undergraduate. That is, the notion of
direct experience is already inculcated by a pre-existent
learning experience - which has itself, already, a prior
commitment to a particular view of the world. From
within this context then, I conclude that the notion of
direct experience, that is claimed as a foundation for
knowledge of Reality, is not based on the "Individual",
sui generis; but, on a pre-existent deposit of faith -
which has as its pillars, the stabilizing circular
referentiality of author and text - that channels
experience in pre-scribed directions. Thus, every time
the scholar within the ’discipline’ of International
Relations writes or communicates, the deposit of faith is
reinforced, and the scholar’s belief is enriched.
The undermining of the notion of the "scholar", who
has privileged access to special knowledge, also
undermines the notion of objective reality, which the
"scholar" wants to project. Barbour, to a degree, bears
out the consequences of this realization:
Expectations and conceptual commitments 
influence perceptions both in everyday life and 
in science. Man [sic] supplies the categories 
of interpretation right from the start. The 
very language in which observations are 
reported is influenced by prior theories. The 
presuppositions which the scientist brings to
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his enquiry are reflected in the way he
formulates the problem, the kind of apparatus 
he builds, and the type of variable he
considers important.48
The phenomena, which scholars within the field of 
International Relations mull over, are themselves theory­
laden. Interpretation of experience (and action) is a 
constitutive element of all phenomena; one does not have 
phenomena in a raw or pristine state, to which are added 
common-sense interpretations. Interpretations are made 
in, and are bound to, contextualized sites of historical 
language use. The phenomena of International Relations 
are therefore, from the outset, irrevocably part of the 
historical sites of everyday life. They are constituted 
in every human action and experience as historically 
specific contexts of significance and motivation.
That is to say, while there is a staggering amount 
of data - of human experiences and expressions - that 
might be characterized in one culture or another, by one 
criterion or another, as belonging to the discrete realm 
of International Relations - there is no objective 
representation of that data per se. The phenomena with 
which the scholar deals is solely the creation of the 
scholar’s own enterprise; which is, in turn, governed by 
an over-arching deposit of faith that legitimates the 
scholar’s enterprise. Such phenomena are created for the 
scholar’s own analytical purposes, by his or her own
48 Barbour.I.G., Myths, Models and Paradigms: A 
Comparative Study of Science and Religion New York:
Harper & Row 1972 p.95.
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imaginative acts of re-presentation and generalization. 
International Relations discourse then, has no 
independent existence apart from the Tradition in which 
it is manifest.
By alluding to Gregor Samsa - at the outset of my
story on Metamorphosis - as a metaphor for such a
’tradition’, I was hoping to convey a sense of the
fictive nature of the projection that this Tradition
manifests. I also wanted to connote the impression that
the Tradition - like Gregor Samsa in Kafka’s
Metamorphosis - has woken up in my story to find itself
out of context, alienated and alone, and nothing it does
within that Tradition will change its predicament. My
call for a metamorphosis of the field is exactly that - a
complete change in how one perceives knowledge, truth and
reality. As I mentioned in an earlier story, this is not
just some dry academic argument, for it does go to the
heart of the construction of social relations, and to the
soul of existence itself.
You are what you know. Fifteenth-century
Europeans ’knew’ that the sky was made of 
closed concentric crystal spheres, rotating 
around a central earth and carrying stars and 
planets. That ’knowledge’ structured
everything they did and thought, because it 
told them the truth. Then Galileo’s telescope 
changed the truth.
As a result, a hundred years later everybody 
’knew’ that the universe was open and infinite, 
working like a clock. Architecture, music, 
literature, science, economics, art, politics - 
everything - changed, mirroring the new view 
created by that change in knowledge. ...
All communities in all places at all times 
manifest their own view of reality in what they
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do. The entire culture reflects the
contemporary model of reality. We are what we 
know. And when the body of knowledge changes, 
so do we.49
Further, by employing the dead Kafka and his fictive 
narrative as harbingers of de-struction in a completely 
different spatial and temporal context to that in which 
it was written, one allows a widely deployed, yet hidden, 
literary device within International Relations 
scholarship to surface to the realm of consciousness.
This device, ie., the notion of privileged access, 
creates the illusion of a seamless reality that allows 
the gods to take the form of Natural verities, from which 
the foundation of knowledge can be divined. It is 
circumscribed by what Benjamin defined as ’homogeneous, 
empty time’,50 which is denoted by temporal coincidence 
and measured by calendar and clock.51 Anderson describes 
this form of time as ’a complex gloss upon the word 
"meanwhile"’,52 in which seemingly incommensurate events 
are ordered, bound and unified by the diurnal regularity, 
that allows one to extend a common unity of mind and 
purpose back into the Past - thus creating an unmitigated
4 9 Burke.J. , The Day the Universe Changed
London: British Broadcasting Company 1985 preface, p.ll.
50 Benjamin.W., Illuminations 
London: Fontana 1973 p.265.
51 ibid, p.263.
52 Anderson.B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism London: Verso 1983 p.31.
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link between past and present.53 Difference is reduced 
to a date, while the palpability and eternality of access 
to a common reality is unquestioned.
The formulation of time in this way secretes into 
the minds of ’omniscient’ scholars a subliminal or taken- 
for-granted frame of reference which presumes an 
omnitemporal as well as omnispatial unity, whereby 
notions of Progress, History and Humanity are 
syntagmatically linked in a landscape of fixity that 
fuses the world with horizons that are clearly bounded. 
Within this framework, author and text become autonomous, 
free-floating signs that can be utilized in any time, or 
in any context, to justify any thesis. This form of 
auto-referential causality allows scholars to then evoke 
the Names of thinkers, such as Hobbes, Rousseau or 
Machiavelli as a form of historical legitimation for 
their present thesis, in much the same way that I have 
summoned Kafka to sanctify my own. My use of Kafka 
though, is ironic, for his writing was a writing of 
fiction.
53 ibid. Anderson also argues that once a common 
identity is established with particular entities in the 
Past it is only a slight twist in the tale to then assert 
that the community that one ’belongs’ to now is the same 
as a community in the Past that had the same Name, or a 
similar heritage: ’The idea of a sociological organism
moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a 
precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also 
conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or 
up) history’.
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By my conscious choice of an explicitly fictive
character - ie., Gregor Samsa - as a source of
authoritative legitimation for my case, I hope to have
highlighted the imaginative exegesis that takes place in
the process of writing; and in the use of a network of
citation that freely de-links the author from the context
in which he or she writes. Such a choice is also an
attempt to subvert - by challenging the mode from which
scholarship receives, and re-forms its deposit of faith -
through the use of irony and farcical parody. It is also
meant to raise questions, such as:
What is the structure of a peculiarly 
historical consciousness? What is the
epistemological status of historical
explanations that might be offered to account 
for the materials with which historians might 
ordinarily deal? What are the possible forms 
of historical representation and what are their 
bases? By what authority can historical
accounts claim to be contributions to a secured 
knowledge of reality in general and to the 
human sciences in particular?54
Further, it is to declare that the use of this deposit of
faith from within such a framework is nothing more than a
fortune-cookie bazaar. The use of the authorial sign has
something religious about it. As with current Biblical
exegesis, scholars continually re-invent the morals and
context of past stories so that they will fit into the
scheme which they are preposing for the present. A
54 White.H., ’The Historical Text as Literary Artifact’, 
in Canary.R.H. & Kozicki.H.(ed), The Writing of History: 
Literary Form and Historical Understanding Madison, Wis.: 
University of Wisconsin Press 1978 pp.41-62; specifically 
p . 41.
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’truth is being told, with "facts” to back it up, but a
teller constructs that truth and chooses those
"facts"’.55 This is not a new insight’ as Croce notes:
The practical requirements which underlie every 
historical judgement give to all history the 
character of "contemporary history", because, 
however remote in time events thus recounted 
may seem to be, the history in reality refers 
to the present needs and present situations 
wherein those events vibrate.56
What is new is the re-contextualization of this insight
to undermine the deposit of faith within the ’discipline’
of International Relations. The scholar’s faith lies in
the belief that they have discovered some pre-ordained
fragment of truth, which was furtively left by some
earlier mystic who had some special esoteric insight into
the nature of things. The manifold interpretations of
the Bible though, should signal to scholars within the
field of International Relations the problematic nature
of the authorial sign, as well as the problematic nature
of notions of ’lessons of history’.
The contextualizing process that characterizes the
postmodern genre is a direct response to the totalizing
and universalizing impulses of knowledge forms based on
Enlightenment rationality. I would argue though, that
the resulting contextuality and provisionality are not
causes for despair, for they are to be acknowledged as
55 Foley.B., Telling the Truth: The Theory and Practice 
of Documentary Fiction Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press 1986 p.67.
56 Croce.B., History as the Story of Liberty
Tr. Spriggel.S., London: Allen & Unwin 1941 p.19.
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perhaps the very conditions of knowledge. Today, meaning 
may thus be seen as unstable, contextual, relational and 
provisional, as something different from the unitary, 
closed, evolutionary narratives that have been 
traditionally espoused; furthermore, I would argue that 
it has always been so.
...we must drop our habit of taking the 
different social structures of past periods, 
then stripping them of everything that makes 
them different; so that they all look more or 
less like our own, which then acquires from 
this process a certain air of being there all 
along, in other words, of permanence pure and 
simple. Instead we must leave them their 
distinguishing marks and keep their 
impermanence always before our eyes, so that 
our period can be seen as impermanent too.57
This iconoclastic format is perhaps better metred
and focussed when a compendium of analytical texts on
this-or-that author is situated against one another in
relation to the text or author they are ’studying’.
Coady, for instance, composed such an epitome of the work
done on Hobbes, and it will show itself to be instructive
on the point I am attempting to make:
He [Hobbes] was at the centre of many
controversies during his long life (including 
his ill-starred attempt to square the circle) 
and controversy continues today about how he is 
best interpreted. The issue of Hobbes’
supposed atheism is only one such bone of 
contention. There are those who believe that
he was attempting to produce a wholly 
naturalistic ethico-politico system to replace 
the medieval God-centred outlook but equally 
there are highly intelligent critics who 
portray him as seeking to establish a ’divine 
politics’ based on an ethic of obedience to
57 Willet.J .(ed ), Brecht on Theatre; The Development of 
an Aesthetic Tr. Willet.J. London: Methuen 1964 p.190.
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Divine law. Some treat his account of the
State as showing him to be the first theorist 
and advocate of liberal democracy while others 
see him as a defender of absolutism and 
tyranny, even ’totalitarianism’. His ethical 
theory has been described as subjectivist but 
it also has been characterized as a traditional 
natural law ethic. Others think that he
substitutes morality to law, seeing it as 
constituted by the ruler’s decree. Some regard 
his psychological theory as central to his 
moral philosophy, and others see it as
irrelevant. It is hotly debated whether his 
psychological theory allows for only egoistic 
motives. There are those who see him as a 
defender of bourgeois values and others who 
treat him as hostile to them.58
From within such a montage, the formulation of a right
view of Hobbes’ thought becomes problematic. The
perception of transparency and unmediated access to the
Past is lost, and the authority to which the scholar has
appealed is smashed into a welter of fragments that
mirror only a ubiquitous dissonance present in the
construction of knowledge today. The facts of the Past
do not legitimate a current thesis, but undermine the
theoretical ontology of such affirmations by alluding to
a multiplicity of theoretical postulations that all claim
to re-present the fundamental ideas of a author or text,
yet all presuppose that the author or text originated
from a different foundation.
The veneer of legitimacy that has been etched into
the notion of historical fact is rubbed away. What is
always in the foreground is the perception that the text
58 Coady.C .A .J ., ’Hobbes: Reason, Morality and Politics’, 
in Muschamp.D .(ed), Political Thinkers Melbourne: 
Macmillan 1986 pp.77-93; specifically p.79. The 
bibliography to which his epitome refers is compiled on 
pages 92-93.
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is always written by somebody - who has had particular 
experiences that have been influenced by such things as 
nationality, culture, race, ethnicity, religion, class 
and gender; and who has written from a particular context 
and for a specific purpose. Such visions are always 
oblique. They always entail the unavoidable import of 
political relations - or ideology59 - which inexorably 
influences the outcome of their writings. From within 
this framework, the appeal to past authority becomes 
unstable, contextual and provisional; one realizes that 
it takes a substantial leap of faith to infer that 
surviving textual remnants actually present the Past, and 
are not, simply, a re-presentation of it.
From within this context, consider Braudel’s stated
aim:
Everything must be recaptured and relocated in 
the general framework of history, so that 
despite the difficulties, the fundamental 
paradoxes and contradictions, we may respect 
the unity of history which is also the unity of 
life.60
Braudel’s statement assumes the conditions of knowledge 
that I have been arguing against. It is a similar set of 
assumptions that govern the tradition of International 
Relations, assumptions which I believe acquire a
59 The notion of ideology as it is portrayed here has its 
reference in Althusser’s idea of ideology as both a 
system of representation, and as a necessary and 
unavoidable part of every social totality. Althusser.L., 
For Marx Tr. Brewster.B. New York: Pantheon 1969 pp.231- 
2 .
60 Braudel.F., On History
Tr. Matthews.S., Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1980 p.16.
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religious conviction as they increasingly become
dislocated from other ways of seeing. I agree with
Lacapra’s argument, that this drive for control - for
privileged access and transparency - has been a unifying
factor throughout the Enlightenment Project.
[The] dream of a ’total history’ corroborating 
the historian’s own desire for mastery of a 
documentary repertoire and furnishing the 
reader with a vicarious sense of - or perhaps a 
project for - control in a world out of joint 
has been a lodestar of historiography from 
Hegel to the Annales School.61
Such a conclusion does not entail the destruction of 
past existence and history, though it does entail the 
deconstruction of historiographies which have had the 
dream that through the construction of meta-history one 
has then the foundation for attempts to control, or at 
least define (and thus predict), general laws or features 
of human life that are common in time and space. The 
mode of analysis I have used has the explicit aim of de­
naturalizing what seems natural and taken-for-granted, 
and in this way History becomes differentiated hi­
stories, which force the reader to problematize notions 
of ’objectivity’.
The past existed, but the only traces that are left 
are texts and ’eyewitness’ accounts. Yet, the facts that 
they present are themselves interpretations of events as 
they occurred, and are given particular meaning depending
61 LaCapra.D., History and Criticism
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1985 p.25.
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upon the linguistic codes that inform and pattern their
experience. As Gossman notes:
The historian’s narrative is constructed not 
upon reality itself or upon transparent images 
of it, but on signifiers which the historian’s 
own action transforms into signs. It is not 
historical reality itself but the present signs 
of the historian that limit and order the 
historical narrative.62
One then, has no access to the objective reality of the 
past, as one today has no access to the objective reality 
present - only to the codified discourses that pattern 
and inform what reality is.
The question of "objectivity'* in dealing with the 
legitimization of knowledge is not simply the moot, 
perceptibly narrow one of a methodological format. It 
also relates to the whole structure of how reality is 
represented. Jameson terms this ’the crisis of 
representation’ of our time, ’in which an essentially 
realist epistomology, which conceives of representation 
as the reproduction of subjectivity, of an objectivity 
that lies outside it - projects a mirror theory of 
knowledge and art, whose evaluative categories are those 
of adequacy, accuracy, and Truth itself’.63
62 Gossman.L., ’History and Literature: Reproduction or 
Signification’, in Canary.R.H. & Kozicki.H .(ed), The 
Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical 
Understanding Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin 
Press 1978 p.32.
63 Jameson.F., ’Forward’, in Lyotard.J-F., The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge Tr. Bennington.G. & 
Massumi.B., Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota 
Press 1984 pp.vii-xxi; specifically p.viii.
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Any appeal of aduration to a codified deposit of 
faith, so as to delineate this or that version as best 
approximating what actually was meant by a particular 
author or text - or to delineate what Reality Is - does 
not dissolve the dilemma, but only entrenches it in an 
infinite causal loop that can never be contested. This 
is because the deposit of faith is self-authenticating; 
for, while there is scope to falsify the thesis of a 
particular scholar in an act of comparison with texts 
within the deposit, there is no scope to falsify the 
ontology of the deposit as a whole. My call for a 
metamorphosis accepts the incommensurability of the 
deposit of faith of International Relations with other 
knowledge forms, but it also accepts that a leap of faith 
is also needed for metamorphosis to take place.
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IV
With so much said about the problematic nature of
the deposit within International Relations, it is perhaps
appropriate now to discuss the genre of discourse that I
have used to sign-post my appeal for a metamorphosis. As
I mentioned in a previous story, the postmodernist genre
has no essence. There are, in this sense, only
’postmodernisms’ - a collection of fictions that have the
common purpose of undermining the traditionally accepted
view of Enlightenment rationality. McHale points out
that every scholar within the postmodern genre constructs
postmodernism in his or her own way, with the aim of
addressing the different contexts that Enlightenment
rationality is manifest in. He goes on to argue that
this contextualization of the focus of the postmodern
enterprise leads to the contextualization of any possible
meaning of "postmodernism”:
Thus, there is John Barth’s postmodernism, the 
literature of replenishment; Charles Newman’s 
postmodernism, the literature of inflationary 
economy; Jean-Francois Lyotard’s postmodernism, 
a general condition of knowledge in the 
contemporary informational regime; Ihab 
Hassan’s postmodernism, a stage on the road to 
the spiritual unification of humankind; and so 
on. There is even Kermode’s construction of 
postmodernism, which in effect constructs it 
right out of existence.64
Hutcheon gives a further list of manifest 
’postmodernisms’:
64 McHale.B., Postmodernist Fiction 
London: Methuen 1987 p.4.
54
...we should also include Fredric Jameson’s 
postmodernism, the cultural logic of late 
capitalism; Jean Baudrillard’s postmodernism, 
in which the simulacrum gloats over the body of 
the deceased referent; Kroker and Cook’s 
(related) hyperreal dark side of postmodernism; 
Sloterdijk’s postmodernism of cynicism or 
’enlightened false consciousness’; and Alan 
Wilde’s literary ’middle grounds’ of the 
postmodern.6 5
To the list of ’postmodernisms’ that have been 
presented above, one could also include McHale’s and 
Hutcheon’s particular manifestation of postmodernist 
analysis. The reason for constructing the genre in this 
way is not to make any critique of the genre difficult, 
but to highlight the non-essential nature of the 
enterprise. That is, the genre’s ’foundations’ are 
already critically contested by a self-reflexive tendency 
within the analytical framework that is postulated.
Thus, when I outline some of the analytical framework of 
the postmodernist form that I have utilized to highlight 
the problematic nature of the tradition of International 
Relations, one should not presume some Archimedean point 
of unity. While my ideas have a clear similarity to 
those within the genre of the postmodern, it should be 
noted that they have been customized to deal with the 
specific nature of the ’discipline’ of International 
Relations. Perhaps one could heuristically utilize the 
metaphor of "family resemblance" here, so that while 
there is a family resemblance, this does not mean that 
they are identical twins.
65 Hutcheon.L., The Politics of Postmodernism 
London: Routledge 1989 p.ll.
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The notion of "critical theory",66 that is used to 
delineate a specific strand of critique within the 
’discipline’ of International Relations, has its genesis 
in the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School is 
associated with a peculiarly German reconstruction of 
neo-Marxist thought that aims at critiquing capitalist 
forms of domination. The use of the term "critical 
theory", as it pertains to analysis in International 
Relations, seems to have a far more eclectic connotation 
though, referring more to various forms of critique that 
challenge principles in the "realist" tradition. Those 
that tend to be categorized under the umbrella of 
"critical theory" draw their ideas not only from the 
German strand of postmodernism (Habermas seems to be 
currently popular in this strand of thought67 ), but also 
from the French strand (Foucault’s ideas seem to have 
currency at the moment68 ), as well as a welter of
66 The first to propose the term "critical theory" was 
Max Horkheimer. See Horkheimer.M ., ’Traditional and 
Critical Theory’, in Critical Theory: Selected Essays Tr. 
0 ’Connell.M ., et al., New York: Herder & Herder 1972
pp.188-243.
67 For example, see Habermas.J., Knowledge and Human 
Interests Tr. Shapiro.J .J ., London: Heinemann 1972; 
Habermas.J., Theory and Practice Tr. Viertel.J., London: 
Heinemann 1974; Habermas.J., Communication and the 
Evolution of Society Tr. McCarthy London: Heinemann 1979; 
and Habermas.J., The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
Tr. Lawrence.F., Boston: MIT Press 1987.
68 For example, see Foucault.M., The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences New York: Pantheon 
1970; Foucault.M., 1972 op. cit.; Focault.M., Madness and 
Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason 
Tr. Howard.R., New York: Vintage 1973; and Foucault.M., 
The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction Tr. 
Hurley.R., New York: Vintage 1980.
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fragmented ideas that stem from American pragmatism, and 
the English tradition of sociology and philosophy.
In this story I will compare the two dominant 
strands of postmodernist critique that are utilized 
within the ’discipline’ of International Relations 
(German and French) with my own. Though both strands are 
at odds with one another, I do not side with either; 
rather, perhaps because my own experiential context is 
different again to theirs, I argue for still another way 
of seeing. The differences between the two strands - 
over aim and outcome - result from the differences of the 
cultural context that each draws upon. The French strand 
draws on the tradition of the 1789 French Revolution - of 
freedom, equality and fraternity, revolutionary spirit, 
radical change, and suspicion of the institutional class; 
the German tradition draws on a deep suspicion of 
revolutionary praxis - and is more drawn to consensus 
politics that institute reform rather than revolution.
The current differences arise from the 1968 social 
upheaval that echoed throughout the ’West’. While 
Habermas advised students to confine their thoughts and 
actions to the grounds of the university,69 the French 
intellectuals marched with the working class in the 
streets of Paris, demanding revolutionary change.
69 Habermas.J., Towards a Rational Society 
Tr. Shapiro.J., Boston: Beacon 1970 p.46.
57
The German tradition, in conjunction with the 
experience of Nazism earlier this century, created for 
scholars like Habermas a historically specific context, 
which seems to have had the consequence of imbuing those 
scholars with a personal predilection toward stability 
and against ’radical’ tendencies. This outcome lead 
Habermas to ’reconstruct’ historical materialism using a 
revised dialectic to interpret history as a set of moral, 
scientific and aesthetic advances that are based on the 
rationality of the autonomous "individual"; and which 
have culminated, in the present stage, in a form of 
communicative rationality that allows human emancipation 
- or, ’old European human dignity’70 - to be attained.71 
"Communicative rationality" is based on democratic 
consensus, whereby reason and truth enable - and are 
enabled by - science, which is ’governed by ideals of an 
objectivity and impartiality secured through unrestricted 
discussion’ .7 2
The French, from a very different historically 
specific context, perceived Enlightenment rationality as 
a locus of power which is continually utilized by class 
elites to manifest a multitude of discourses of 
domination. They argued that those who employed the
70 Habermas.J,, 1970 ibid, p.143.
71 See Habermas.J., Legitimation Crisis
Tr. McCarthy.T., Boston: Beacon 1975; Habermas.J., 
’History and Evolution’, in Telos 39:2:5-44 1979.
72 Habermas.J., The Theory of Communicative Action,
Vol.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Analysis Tr. McCarthy.T., Boston: Beacon 1987 p.91.
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’voice of reason’ have always assumed that that "voice"
was a universal one that could speak for all humanity.
This they argued was not only ethnocentric, but was
itself the referential foundation for discourses of
domination. Thus, they argued for a theoretical
framework that would undermine notions of universality
and empower the margins of social formations. To this
end scholars like Foucault took a dark pleasure in
taunting Enlightenment-minded scholars with the prospect
that the whole ’universalizing’ enterprise of the
Academy, as traditionally perceived, was for nought:
Is there not a danger that everything that has 
so far protected the historian in his [sic] 
daily journey and accompanied him until 
nightfall (the destiny of rationality and 
teleology of the sciences, the long, continuous 
labour of thought from period to period, the 
awakening and the progress of consciousness, 
its perpetual resumption of itself, the 
uncompleted, but uninterrupted movement of 
totalizations, the return to an ever-open 
source and finally the historico-transcendental 
thematic) may disappear, leaving for analysis a 
blank, indifferent space, lacking in both
interiority and promise?73
Habermas perceived French notions, such as the one 
above, as a retreat from the project of the 
Enlightenment, not an advance upon it. Habermas calls 
Foucault an ’anarchist’74, and deems the whole French 
school to be ’Young Conservatives’, who, as disciples of 
Nietzsche’s antirationalism, embrace a ’regressive turn
73 Foucault.M., 1972 op. cit., p.39.
74 Habermas.J., ’Ideologies and Society in a Post-War 
World’, in Dews.P.(ed), Autonomy and Solidarity: 
Interviews London: Verso 1986 p.46.
59
[that] enlists the powers of emancipation in the service
of counter-enlightenment’.75 Further, he argues that the
French mystify peculiarly ’modern experiences’, by
referencing their analytical framework in historically
distant social formations that differ substantively in
world-view from current ones.
[The French scholars project the experience of 
unreason] backwards into archaic origins, onto 
Dionysian, the pre-Socratic, the exotic and 
primitive. This kind of nachgeahmte
Substantialitat was completely alien to Adorno 
and Benjamin [members of the Frankfurt School].
It never occurred to them to mystify peculiarly 
modern experiences in this fashion. For that 
is what this radical criticism of reason in 
effect amounts to, with its tabulation of 
precivilizational states. We have had all 
that, in Germany, so immediately at hand that 
you can smell it ever afterwards: the
artificial mystification of something so close 
into something supposedly so primordial.76
As can be seen from the above passage, Habermas’
criticism of the French as ’conservative’ is based on the
fear that the French framework could be utilized to
manifest mythologies, such as those which were manifest
by the Nazi Party in the Second World War. In this
context I understand his dilemma - for instance, he
realizes that postmodern thought and scholarship must, to
a degree, take place in the rational framework of the
modern to make sense - but I do not believe, as he does,
that this realization necessitates a celebration of
75 See Habermas.J., ’Modernity and Postmodernity’, in New 
German Critique 1981 Winter 22:3-18; specifically p.13; 
and, Habermas.J., ’The Entwinement of Myth and 
Enlightenment’, in New German Critique 1982 Spring/Summer 
26:13-30; specifically p.29.
76 Dews.P.(ed), 1986 op. cit. p.203.
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Enlightenment rationality in a meta-narrative form. I 
agree with Poster, when he asserts that Habermas is 
merely favouring one form of totality rather than 
another:
When Habermas defends with the label of reason 
what he admires in Western culture, he
universalizes the particular, grounds the 
conditional, absolutises the finite. He
provides a centre and an origin for a set of 
discursive practices. He undermines critique 
in the name of critique by privileging a locus 
of theory (reason) that far to closely 
resembles society’s official discourse. 
...Habermas, instead, aims to locate the point 
where he can speak the truth, define its 
conditions, and plot the next stage of human 
emancipation accordingly. His strategy is that 
of Marx, Freud, and the Enlightenment: to
oppose him is to be an enemy of mankind [sic],
1 ’infame, whose only fate is to be crushed. 
Habermas’s strategy is one of totalization: to
encompass the position of rational
enlightenment to such an extent that all 
opponents are irrational.77
Habermas has already presumed that which he wants to
argue. From this context I accept that the reference
point for my particular form of postmodernism is
influenced far more by the French than the Germans. This
does not mean though, that I also accept many of the
corollary French beliefs that implicitly have a
commitment to a theory of agency, in one form or another.
The French are writing from within a specific social
context, and are attempting to undermine particular
privileged concepts that are utilized as sources of
social domination that they believe are unjust. In this
77 Poster.M., Critical Theory and Poststructuralism 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1989 pp.22- 
23,32.
the French are going beyond the critiquing of social
forms, and in so doing are privileging other concepts
that they believe are just. As Ryan argues:
...the deconstructive critique of absolutist 
concepts in the theory of meaning can be said 
to have a political-institutional corollary, 
which is the continuous revolutionary 
displacement of power toward radical 
egalitarianism and the plural diffusion of all 
forms of macro - and microdomination.78
The theoretical framework they utilize though,
necessitates certain reflexive theoretical limits. One
of these limits is necessitated by the realization that
all theories of agency - ie., the way one should act in
the world - are already implicated in a form of ideology
If the French argue against one set of privileged
concepts in favour of another set, what is the basis for
privileging the second set? To justify their own
privileged concepts they must accept in large part the
philosophical rationality they were attempting to
undermine. The deconstructive format is extremely
powerful, for it works completely within the rationalist
framework - but in a subversive manner - so as to
undermine any "absolutist" or "universalist" tendencies.
It can gain validity only as a negative form of ’Western
rationality. It allows creative insight into the
creation and maintenance of social forms, but one should
not mistake this reconstruction as in some way alluding
78 Ryan.M., Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical 
Articulation Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
1982 p .8.
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to reality in a more quintessential form. All
’postmodernisms’ are fictions, in the sense that they are
not attempting to depict Reality in itself.
Those scholars within the field of International
Relations who avail themselves of the French or German
postmodern framework tend to project the French concern
for commitment to notions of justice and equality into
the international sphere. This not only has the problem
of privileging certain theoretical concepts (ie., justice
and equality), but such arguments also have the added
problem of validating these concepts cross-culturally.79
Consider the perceptive work of Walker in this regard:
The primary ground for ethical reflection 
remains a capacity to identify the intolerable.
And at a certain level, it is not too difficult 
to identify a range of the most intolerable 
features of modern life: the tremendous
resources devoted to potential species 
extermination; the legitimacy of forms of 
economic development that continue to bring 
extreme wealth to some while threatening the 
very survival of others; the rapacious
destruction of the planetary habitat in the 
name of progress and profit; the flagrant abuse 
of established human rights.80
Although Walker is aware of the crisis of
representation, he perpetuates the myth of the universal
by advocating it in a slightly different form. In this
79 By "culture" I do not mean Culture, but rather, 
’culture’ or culture. In this sense culture comes to 
mean a social formation that is different to my own, yet 
within this formation there are a series of specialized 
knowledge forms that differ in their aim and outcome.
80 Walker.R.B.J., ’Ethics, Modernity and the Theory of 
International Relations’. A paper prepared for the 
conference on New Directions in International Relations: 
Implications for Australia. Australian National 
University, Canberra. February 15-17, 1989 p.2.
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Walker seems to be typical of the "critical theory 
school" within International Relations. For while such 
scholars attack the "realist" strand for reifying their 
enterprise, "critical theorists" themselves seem 
reluctant to self-reflexively critique their own 
framework. For instance, what is the ’certain level’ at 
which the ’intolerable’ can be easily identified?
Further, on what basis does Walker project his notion of 
the ’intolerable’ onto various social formations? In the 
face of what seems to those scholars to be the reductio 
ad absurdum of a deconstructive framework there appears 
to be a shift back to a claim of universal needs, desires 
and interests so as to try and ground the existence of 
universal norms.
I would argue that although scholars such as Walker 
are committed to an emancipatory praxis, their 
theoretical framework entails a new meta-narrative form - 
a new discourse of domination. That is, while such 
scholars set out to project diversity and difference they 
end up supporting a subtle form of cultural imperialism. 
Scholars, such as Walker, would be horrified at this 
suggestion, but I believe that it can be sustained.
As soon as one reads a text, such as Walker’s One 
World, Many Worlds,81 it is overwhelmingly clear that 
Walker’s intent is to herald a diffusion of power from
81 Walker.R.B.J., One World, Many Worlds: Struggles For A 
Just World Peace Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers 1988.
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the centre to ’critical social movements’ at the margins 
of social structure. How can I claim then that he is 
attempting to construct a new discourse of domination?
To this I would first ask what his basis is for 
projecting a de-totalizing framework onto other social 
forms that have different linguistic and social 
traditions to his own? I accept that he is justified 
within a ’Western’ philosophical tradition to use a 
contextually contingent de-totalizing framework - born of 
that tradition - to highlight the short-comings of that 
tradition. I do not accept that he can simply presume 
that this de-totalizing framework can then be transmuted 
into different linguistic and social forms, not just to 
analyse, but to transform those different forms into what 
he perceives as just.
One of the defining features of the postmodern genre 
is that it accepts the contextually contingent nature of 
linguistic, social and historical forms; it also accepts 
the corollary, which is that the postmodern form is 
itself contextually contingent, ie., born of a 
contextually specific history to meet contextually 
specific needs. With this in mind, what is the basis for 
Walker’s denunciation of "fundamentalisms",82 not only 
within the ’Western’ philosophical tradition, but also 
within traditions that eye with great suspicion the whole 
’Western’ philosophical tradition of logic and
82 ibid. pp.14-15.
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rationality? It seems that Walker is wanting to project
a particular form of ethics or morality that results in
closure - ie., a new totalizing form.
The corollary to the first part of my argument with
scholars such as Walker is effectively elaborated by
Putnam, when she problematizes the North American
pragmatism of Rorty.83 Putnam constructs a theoretical
scenario to highlight the totalizing practices of
scholars who appear at first to be celebrating diversity
and difference, but are instead trying to impose their
own ideas, beliefs and values onto the different forms
that they are advocating. Putnam asks what will
scholars, such as Rorty, say when confronted by a German
(Karl) who states that "snow is white”.
...the sentence ’Snow is white as determined by 
the norms of German culture’ is itself one 
which R.R. [Richard Rorty] has to use, not just 
mention, to say what Karl says. On this 
account, what R.R. means by this sentence is:
’Snow is white as determined by the norms of 
German culture’ is true by the norm’s of R.R.’s 
culture (which we take to be American 
culture).8 4
Thus, for scholars such as Rorty or Walker, other 
social forms are only legitimate if they conform to 
specific preconceptions of justice or egalitarianism that 
are themselves generated from the scholar’s own belief 
and commitment to a particular pluralist form. The 
resulting diversity that is manifest by such
83 Rorty.R., Consequences of Pragmatism 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1982.
84 Putnam.H., Realism and Reason
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983 p.237.
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constructions becomes the basis for a new totality, for 
it is only ’tolerant’ of philosophical, religious, 
historical and social forms that compare favourably to 
their own belief and commitment. This perception is also 
effectively argued by Chow, who notes that many of the 
postmodern forms appropriate Third World cultures merely 
for the scholar’s own ideological ends.85 At this point 
I will again state that I do not believe that the 
postmodern form has any inherent theory of agency. It 
has no basis or blue-print to reconstruct social forms. 
Its power lies only in being able to undermine 
"universalisms” or "totalities", not in constructing 
them. Its analytical strength comes from its ability to 
highlight the hidden ideological element in "absolutist" 
discourses.
The standard critical evaluation of the postmodern 
form is epitomized by Gablik, who asserts, ’To the 
postmodernist mind, everything is empty at the 
centre....[the] vision is not integrated - and it lacks 
form and definition’.86 I would modify this somewhat and 
argue the centre is not so much empty as contested. The 
postmodern form is saturated with ’Western’ rationality, 
but importantly, it uses that rationality to critically 
evaluate itself. I believe that this subversive
85 Chow.R., ’Rereading Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies: A 
Response to the "Postmodern" Condition’, in Cultural 
Critique 1986/87 5:69-93; specifically p.91.
86 Gablik.S., Has Modernism Failed?
London: Thames 1984 p.17.
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duplicity avoids the reduct io ad absurdum belief that the 
deconstruetive impulse can operate outside, or beyond, 
the linguistic structures that are already present. It 
contests itself by a self-reflexive component that 
undermines the appeal to the "universal”, and highlights 
the contextually contingent nature of the enterprise; 
this, I believe, is missing in the analysis of scholars 
within the "critical theory" strand.
As can be seen from the above discussion, my call 
for a metamorphosis does not entail the normal "critical 
theory" strand’s concerns with reconstructing a ’better 
world’. I see such formulations as problematic, and as 
reified as the "realist" notions they are trying to 
usurp. Rather, I perceive the power of the postmodern 
form, as it relates to the field of International 
Relations, as enabling the scholar to dispense with the 
traditional deposit of faith, and the reified 
categorizations that that deposit produces.
I would argue that if the scholar accepted the self­
reflexive component that is inherent in the postmodern 
form, then the reference for analysis is critically 
shifted from the deposit of faith in International 
Relations - which believes itself to be interpreting 
Reality - to a variety of deposits that are manifest in a 
multitude of social forms around the world. One is no 
longer referencing phenomena to a pre-existent deposit; 
instead, one is referencing the projections of reality of
68
other social forms in themselves to a framework of 
analysis that is not attempting to validate or falsify 
the beliefs that are held by those social forms.
The power of the postmodern framework of analysis 
for International Relations lies in its ability to 
understand how other social forms are constructed and 
maintained. Its focus is on the belief, faith and 
commitment that people have to a variety of assumptions 
they take to be the Truth about Reality. The postmodern 
form can effectively understand these other social forms 
because it has no inherent belief or commitment to a 
particular social form itself.
While the lack of commitment may be disconcerting to 
some scholars who may feel that my postmodernist form 
leads to ’quietism’ or ’paralysis’, I would ask those 
scholars to look more closely. This is not a reductio ad 
absurdum argument, in which the king is enthroned back 
into his palace by default. There is no succour to be 
found in the deposit of faith as it has been thus 
perpetuated. I agree with Burke (see fn.48); if you can 
supply a catalyst that allows you to change the 
postulates for a way of seeing, that way of seeing will 
be transformed.
That metamorphosis is not just a theoretical one, 
but one that is projected onto all reality, all existence 
- so that it becomes reality, it becomes existence. Do 
not mistake this new reality as being REAL; it is not the
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Reality of the past, but rather a crucial transformation 
that has taken place, for reality refers to a welter of 
contextually-specific realities that cluster around their 
own linguistic and social forms, which may be 
comparatively paradoxical and incommensurate with one 
another. Thus, by shifting the reference point of 
analysis away from the deposit of faith in International 
Relations to a multitude of contextually-specific 
deposits, one does more than just institute a new 
framework of analysis. One re-creates reality.
This reality thus created could then be utilized by 
scholars to allow them to conjure new patterns of 
relevance and relation. For example, with these new 
patterns, scholars could then embark on political 
crusades for hitherto ’unseen’ injustices and 
inequalities. The analytical framework could also be 
employed by those working ’in the national interest’, by 
utilizing the powerful focus on the internal construction 
of social forms to improve predictability, and in this 
way forestall ’chaos’. It might even be used to socially 
engineer social forms by utilizing the understanding of 
their generation and maintenance so as to truncate 
’undesirable’ aspects of that social form, and promote 
aspects that would enhance ’the national interest’ 
(perhaps this is what Habermas feared!). All this is
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possible because the reference point for analysis has 
been switched from the deposit within to a series of 
deposits on the outside.
The mode of Metamorphosis and Other Stories is not 
one of missionary zeal; its aim is not to convert. To 
"convert" implies a belief that I Know some Truth of the 
World, and that I have a Desire or Will to project that 
Truth onto the World for all Humanity. What I have said 
is not to be taken as True, for it is a story - a 
fiction, that is largely rhetorical. It could have been 
written in a variety of different ways, highlighting 
different points of relevance and relation, and having a 
completely different outcome. Each point drives the 
next, if the modes and kernels of the story are changed, 
so does the story and the understanding that it is trying 
to convey. There is no set way of saying, and there is 
no set way of seeing.
Any conversion as it were, would only take place if 
the reader wished it. Metamorphosis is not trying to act 
(nor could it even if it wanted to) at a meta-theoretical 
level; there is no grand theory upon which to usurp and 
de-struct the deposit which would attract a mass 
movement. Again, the essay is largely rhetorical, it is 
aimed only at those who are unsatisfied with the ’world’ 
as they currently experience it. In this context a
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postmodern form, such as mine, is a powerful alternative 
for understanding the ’world’; but, like all belief 
systems, it does take a leap of faith.
It is impossible to specify or define the kind of 
understanding that might prevail from a postmodern 
enterprise, except in general terms. At the beginning of 
this last story I outlined the notion that there was not 
a postmodernism - but postmodernisms. Through 
highlighting this, I hoped to engender the impression 
that the creation of a way of seeing was, overwhelmingly, 
an individual enterprise. What would be created would 
depend upon such things as a scholar’s past experience of 
the ’world’ - his or her political beliefs, religious 
beliefs, the context in which it was written (both 
historical and geographic), the focus and reason for 
creating, the scholar’s own imagination, etc.. The kind 
of understanding that could be created would be 
contextually contingent in time and space. Such 
postmodernisms could well be juxtaposed to one another, 
or they could even be incommensurate with one another in 
their way of seeing.
In general terms, the understanding gained from my 
postmodern form comes from not trying to classify or 
define ’phenomena’ of the ’world’ into pre-existent 
categories. That is, not using theories of the State, or 
Organizations, or Human Nature, or Universal Reason, 
etc., to classify the actions of groups and individuals.
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These typologies, while they may well be edifying to 
those utilizing them, reify the will and intent of other 
social forms.
The deposit of faith in International Relations is 
exactly that, a belief system that sustains those that 
believe in it - it gives them a coherent way of 
interpreting the ’world’. It is not very effective in 
understanding other social forms, because essentially it 
is in competition with those other forms. I argue that 
Metamorphosis is a powerful alternative to the deposit, 
because it accepts those other forms - and their own 
deposits - in themselves. It can do this because it has 
no commitment to any particular social form itself. It 
is parasitic, it is very effective in deconstructing 
discursive practices, but, as it has no theory of agency, 
it cannot reconstruct the ’world’ at a meta-theoretical 
level - as the deposit in International Relations has 
been structured to do. The ’world’ is a myriad of social 
forms - contextually contingent in time and space - which 
are continually deconstructed and reconstructed to 
account for the particular context that they face. 
Metamorphosis can understand those forms, but it believes 
that none are True.
While I believe what I have said to be true, that is 
not the primary purpose of my writing these stories. The 
primary purpose for writing these stories is to be 
admitted to the Masters degree in International
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Relations.07 The acknowledgement of this political 
agenda is imperative as part of the self-reflexive 
process within my own analytical framework; and it is 
this same self-reflexivity that leaves me with the uneasy 
feeling that I have already said too much.
87 Fry.G., MA (International Relations): The Sub-Thesis
Canberra: Australian National University (IR) N.D.
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